Tesla’s boss, Elon Musk, once thought the idea that China’s BYD could compete with his company was laughable. In 2011, he smugly dismissed the Chinese carmaker as unimpressive, its products unattractive and its technology “not very strong”. He’s not laughing now – and not just because Tesla’s stock has plummeted amid a boycott by motorists protesting against his embrace of far-right politics. More pressingly, Mr Musk, like other western carmakers, has been outpaced by BYD.
Last week, the Chinese electric vehicle (EV) manufacturer unveiled new charging technology that, it says, is capable of delivering 400km (249 miles) of driving range in just five minutes – as quick as filling up a petrol car. The system, released next month, will be fitted in two EVs, priced from 270,000 yuan (£29,000) – comparable to Tesla’s most affordable model in China. Yet BYD claims to quadruple Tesla’s kilometres-per-minute charging rate. Technological supremacy at a competitive price may help to explain why BYD now sells seven times as many cars in China as Tesla.
A lack of fast-charging infrastructure may delay BYD’s progress in the west. But that shouldn’t diminish the scale of China’s technological advance. It was only in 2015 that Beijing launched its Made in China 2025 plan, targeting 10 strategic industries – including EVs – for rapid indigenous development. China’s approach follows a familiar playbook. Just as the US once did, China shifted from exporting raw materials to becoming a manufacturing powerhouse by protecting domestic industries, acquiring foreign technology – sometimes dubiously – and prioritising exports. Taking cues from history, Beijing has used tariffs, subsidies and state investment to dominate industries from steel and electronics to EVs.
When a country rapidly monopolises export markets, its industrial dominance becomes inevitable. That advantage has often hardened into a global stranglehold over key industries. With its commanding edge in EVs, China’s leadership is poised to set the rules and dictate, on its own terms, the future of the technology. It did so on the cheap: BYD reportedly received Chinese government subsidies worth about a quarter of the $15bn that Mr Musk’s Tesla obtained from US authorities.
The case for electric cars is clear. They cut emissions and pollution while preserving personal mobility. But the climate crisis raises a deeper question – not just how we power vehicles, but whether our reliance on them is sustainable. Switching to EVs is vital, but so is asking: do we need fewer car journeys, not just cleaner ones?
Despite its lead in EVs, China’s 30,000 miles of high-speed rail network offers a striking alternative. Meanwhile, Mr Musk’s transport visions often appear to be self-interested sleights of hand. His high-speed transportation system, Hyperloop, was never meant to be built – its true success was in derailing California’s high-speed rail project. His Boring Company is building a 68-mile underground system in Las Vegas, primarily, it seems, because regulators agreed to minimal oversight.
There’s an old joke about dictators: at least the trains run on time. Can a democracy taken over by oligarchs manage even that? China has high-speed rail; Mr Musk has a couple of miles of tunnels under Nevada. But supposed “authoritarian competence” is not the answer. Only more capable, more democratic government – the kind Mr Musk scorns – can reverse the US’s steady loss of economic, industrial, technological and governance competitiveness.
