Russia Gave North Korea Its Pantsir Air Defense Truck

Moscow has transferred at least one Pantsir short-range air defense vehicle discretely via cargo ship to North Korea amongst other weapons, as a repayment for North Korea’s deployment of an estimated 14,000 troops on Russian soil to combat Ukrainian forces suffering roughly 33% casualties.

That’s according to a report published this May 29 by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) a watchdog organization formed to monitor violations of a UN arms embargo placed on North Korea since its nuclear bomb test in 2006. MSMT was formed after Russia effectively killed the UN panel assigned to monitor the embargo last year.

Short-range air defense systems (SHORADS) are hardly ‘strategic’ weapons of the kind North Korea has focused on developing. But they do have a application to protecting strategic weapons, and the headquarters that can order their use.

The report also indicates Russia transferred refined petroleum products, electronic warfare systems for mounting on North Korea’s Russian cargo planes, and technical feedback on the performance of the North Korea’s Hwasong-11A and -11B short-range ballistic. Pyongyang reportedly furnished 148 Hwasong-11s for use by Russia against Ukrainian cities, though these allegedly demonstrating a roughly 50% failure rate after launch.

The transfer of “at least one Pantsir vehicle” leaves unclear whether North Korea received the other vehicles ordinarily forming a complete Pantsir battery/system. However, even one vehicle could help Pyongyang evaluate whether to acquire more, or to devise a semi-indigenous Pantsir spinoff with assistance from its Russian manufacturer.

The new report follows the earlier sighting of what looks like a naval Pantsir-ME system mounted on North Korea’s large new Choi Hyeon missile destroyers, for which they might provide some defense against anti-ship missile attacks.

Pantsir-S: Capabilities, Context and Drone Woes

While longer-range surface-to-air missile systems like Patriot or S-300 can threaten high-flying aircraft dozens or even hundreds of miles away, SHORADS like Pantsir defend against drones, missiles, and low-flying aircraft that may have overwhelmed the long-range defenses, or evaded interceptions thanks to small radar cross-sections and/or masking against terrain.

Though SHORADS defend a much smaller “point” area and can’t engage high-flying jets or drones, they deter low-altitude approaches and serve as last ditch ‘goalie’ when the rest of the team’s defense fails.

Unlike ground army SHORADS systems, truck-based Pantsir-Ss serve primarily in Russia’s Aerospace Force to protect long-range air defenses from missile attacks, as well as airbases, HQs, urban centers and other key areas. North Korea would likely find similar rear-area duties if it deployed modern SHORADS, such as guarding national leadership and nuclear weapons assets.

Various Pantsir-S models (codenamed SA-22 Greyhound) detect approaching threats using one or two phased-array radars as well as an optical/infrared sensor–hardware likely driving its $15 million-per-vehicle export cost.

Each vehicle carries eight or twelve 57E6-series missiles, up to four of which can be launched in rapid succession at different targets up to 12 or 19 miles away depending on sub model. These are guided to target via radio-commands issued from the vehicle based on combined radar and optical tracking data. For threats that close within the minimum-range of its missiles, the vehicles also sports a turret with rapid-firing twin 30-millimeter autocannons.

While Pantsir vehicles can operate individually, multiples are grouped into batteries or ‘systems’, also including a command post that can remotely control the gun/launcher trucks and a radar vehicle for improved early warning.

Despite these capabilities, over the last decade Pantsir-Ms have mostly made headlines getting defeated by enemy air attacks in Syria, Libya and Ukraine—particularly by drones, including both kamikaze drones and Turkish-built TB2 Bayraktars armed with missiles.

Notably in the Idlib and Tripoli campaigns in 2020, and the Battle of Snake Island in 2022, the systematic destruction of Pantsirs in battles of attrition with Bayraktars contributed to major operational defeats for Russia or its allies.

Several Russian reports concurred that Pantsir-Ms struggled to detect and engage drones, both in Syria and in a Russian trial in 2020 in which they reportedly detected drones only within their minimum missile-engagement range.

Photos show Russia has lost at least 27 Pantsirs by May 2025 in Ukraine to a mix of drones, GMLR rockets, ATACMS missiles, and precision artillery shells. The system was also likely involved in a mistaken attack on an Azerbaijani airliner that killed 67, and a friendly-fire downing of a Russian Navy Ka-29 helicopter.

However, Russia’s Pantsir units have since 2023 seen extensive combat use battling the aforementioned Western weapons as well as Ukraine’s long-range strike drones, including deployments atop Moscow high-rises to guard against drone raids.

Given the large scale of Ukrainian drone raids and Russian air defense operations to counter them, the system has seen extensive combat use with which to inform technical updates and to improve counter-drone and counter-missile tactics. There are also experiments in devising new configurations for drone defense.

Would North Korean Pantsirs pose a problem for South Korea?

Should a conflict escalate with North Korea, South Korea’s ‘Kill-Chain’ defense strategy might kick into motion aiming to preemptively neutralize Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction (and the command-and-control links galvanizing them into action) through targeted strikes by stealthy F-35 Lightnings, F-15K SLAM Eagles launching Taurus cruise missiles, and various ground- and sea-based missile systems.

Standing in the way of that strategy is Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF’s) large but dilapidated ground-based air defense system counting around 200 S-75 and S-125M short-to-medium-range launchers (SA-2 and SA-3) from the 1950s and 60s, and maybe ten 1960s-era long-range S-200s. The only modern addition might involve indigenous truck-based Pongae-5 SAM systems apparently derived from Russia’s S-300P and/or similar Chinese HQ-9 systems.

North Korea’s SHORADs are just as dated, relying on Soviet man-portable missiles, 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher) tracked vehicles, and numerous flak guns.

Should Pyongyang eventually standup multiple Pantsir-like SHORAD batteries, it could selectively enhance defenses at several sensitive nuclear weapons sites, threatening to intercept some percentage of standoff-range missiles lobbed at them. Already, Russian air defenses reportedly evolved (after early disasters) to impose attrition on Western rockets and missiles supplied to Ukraine, compelling Kyiv to expend munitions more per target.

Obviously South Korea doesn’t want to expend even more missiles should it need to disable Pyongyang’s nuclear assets ASAP. Seoul’s armed forces do, however, have ample tools to suppress enemy air defenses (SEAD), including F-35A stealth fighters and diverse standoff precision-guided weapons. Admittedly, South Korea lacks kamikaze drones like the Harop used by Israel to destroy Pantsirs, and more recently by India targeting Pakistan’s Chinese air defenses. However, Seoul is developing a high-end medium-range loitering munition that could take on a Harop-like role, so the capability gap may be fleeting.

Nonetheless, were North Korea to eventually deploy a distributed, improved SHORADS capability, the need to suppress it would add to the taskload facing South Korea and allies under a time of crunch trying to knock out North Korean nukes before they launch.

Russia’s Pantsir-transfer might end up remaining a one-and-done deal, as sometimes happens. However, the possibility Russia might further assist Pyongyang in improving its ability to “absorb” potential missile attacks targeting its nuclear forces is surely unwelcome in Seoul and Washington. Of course, air defense transfers by Moscow might come at the expense of defending Russian airspace from Ukraine’s evolving long-range strike campaign, and risk encouraging Seoul to provide more direct forms of assistance to Kyiv.